Constitutional Reforms for Greece, and Post-Election Suggestions for Mr. Samaras!

On May 6^th, Greece will have the most important election of its post junta era.  The sovereign debt crisis has humbled the country and the EU imposed austerity measures have angered the people.  Unlike the Koskota scandal that led to the 1989 coalition government between Nea Dimocratia (ND) and the Communist Party, the stakes are much higher now.  What is at state is the place of the country within the European Union.

If ND get 30% on the Sunday polls, then along with PASOK they will be able to form a somewhat stable government, and Mr. Samaras (leader of ND) will have a large enough margin in the Parliament (180 out of 300 seats) to push through both the austerity measures and the much needed economic reforms.  However, the most likely outcome is that ND will get less than 30%, which will make any coalition government weak (perhaps even a minority government), unable to implement any real reforms and end up with new elections in a couple of months.

As I argued before, the real cause of the Greek sovereign debt crisis was not simply bad government policies and inefficient collection of taxes.  Rather, it was a collective failure of the current system of governance, which concentrates too much power on the hands of one person (the Prime-Minister) in hopes of achieving swift and holistic resolution of the many problems the country is facing.  Unfortunately, the ‘dictatorship of the Prime-Minister’ and the lack of any serious checks and balances leads to abuse of power and inefficient decision making based purely on political reasons and reelection ambitions.

Mr. Samaras continues to cling on this antiquated model of governance by constantly demanding complete unilateral majority from the electorate.  Instead of recognizing the need for a coalition government that will be inclusive and will both represent more people as well as govern by consensus, he insists that what the country needs now is “a strong government that can push through the much needed reforms.”  Was this not how previous PASOK and ND administrations governed the country during the past 30 years?

Immediate Constitutional Reform

Instead, Mr. Samaras should recognize that the times are changing, and that at least in the near future (next couple of election cycles) smaller parties will do well enough to gain both entry into the parliament as well as prevent one party from forming a government without coalition partners.  Amending the constitution to change the current system of governance might be the only thing his post-election coalition will be able to agree, and it could prove both popular with smaller parties and beneficial to his political career.

What smaller parties want more than anything is a place in parliament and a voice in policy setting.  They want an election system that awards parliamentary seats proportionally, with no bonuses for the most popular party.  Furthermore, in order to be able to ‘shine in the eyes of the electorate’, smaller parties would rather see government ministers (who dominate parliamentary proceedings) out of the parliament and out of the legislative process.

On the other hand, Mr. Samaras wants to be the ‘undisputed’ leader of the government.  As long as he is competing with smaller parties for a parliamentary majority he will be denied the privilege of governing on his own.  If he could reinstate the President as head of the government (as it was under the 1975 Constitution, when the President selects the Prime-Minister and could dissolve the government, and played a greater role in foreign and defense policy) and make the position electable by the people, then Greece could have a presidential system like France.  Mr. Samaras will have no problem winning the presidency in the second round of voting!

The ultimate objective (for the good of the country) is a system of governance that promotes ‘competition’ within the government.  Just like the Greek economy needs to open up and be subject to greater competition, so does the government – with an executive separate from the legislature.  Stronger separation of the executive and the legislative branches will allow them to better focus on their respective duties, which ‘supervising’ each other’s work.

There are four basic constitutional reforms that Mr. Samaras should promote:

1) Make the President the head of the government, with the Prime-Minister as the Vice-President, make the President electable directly by the people, and fix the election of the President in time (same month every four years), and impose term limits (two terms total).

2)  Remove the cabinet from the Parliament (cabinet members cannot be parliament members as well), and the cabinet cannot propose legislation (except for the government budget).  This will strengthen the Parliament, and make it more directly accountable to the people for its legislative products.

3)  Make Parliament electable by a pure proportional representation system, with no bonus for the first party or special ‘nationwide’ seats, and fix Parliamentary elections in time (same month every four years).

4)  Stagger elections every two years (Presidential election in 2012, and Parliamentary election in 2014, and so on), thus creating the possibility of different party’s holding the Presidency and the majority in the Parliament.  This will guarantee the best chance for ‘divided’ government and more ‘competition’ between the branches.

The Process after the Election

Unfortunately, constitutional reforms in Greece are laborious in process and very time consuming.  Amending the constitution requires a majority vote in two consecutive parliaments, one of which will have to approve any constitutional amendments by a three-fifths majority (180/300).  Therefore, if after the Sunday election ND has not gained enough parliamentary seats to form a strong and stable government, it will have to form a coalition government.  Mr. Samaras needs to resist the temptation of holding new elections right away and focus instead on reforming the system of governance.

If ND cannot push forward with the EU/IMF economic reforms and conditions due to lack of parliamentary majority, then maybe the best thing the next parliament could do would be to reform the constitution.  In three months’ time Mr. Samaras can call for new elections, and a new parliament to ratify the amendments to the constitution – opening the way for Presidential elections in the fall under the new system (elected president, government out of the parliament, etc.).

In these politically uncertain times, reforming the system of governance and improving the political process is imperative if Greece is to avoid the mistakes of the past.  Economic reforms and austerity measure are no doubt important, but so is the legislative process and accountable governing.  If the Greeks cannot change their system of governance now that the people are engaged and everything is at stake, they will never do.

The path might be hard and cumbersome, but the results of a better government will be enjoyed forever.

Time for Iraq to Activate its Federation Council!

The political power struggle in Baghdad has significantly escalated since the last U.S. troops withdrew in December 2011, with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki slowly abandoning the principle of a unity government that gives all stakeholders a share of power and instead trying to consolidate power in his own hands.  The situation has deteriorated so much that in a recent interview with the Associated Press the president of Iraq’s self-rule Kurdish region (Massoud Barzani) demanded that Shiite leaders “agree on sharing power with their political opponents by September or else the Kurds could consider breaking away from Baghdad.”  Tony Karon reports, that even the radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose support was critical to getting Maliki reelected, has taken to referring to the Prime Minister as “the dictator.”

The most egregious case of power-grab by Maliki, was the ‘politically motivated’ prosecution of Iraqi Sunni leader and Vice-President of the government Tarek al-Hashemi, who was forced to flee Baghdad to escape criminal charges his supporters see as designed to hobble the Sunni political leadership.  According to Mr. Karon, Hashemi fled first to Erbil, capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), whose terrain the Iraqi security forces are not authorized to enter, and is now in Turkey.

Barzani’s ‘declaration of defiance’ against Maliki, is very much the result of Kurdistan’s long-held desire for independence as well as a consequence of Maliki’s recent attempt to consolidate power.  Although unilateral secession by the Kurds (or the Sunnis) is somewhat unlikely, the escalation of political tensions by Maliki could lead to the eventual break-up of Iraq.

Furthermore, according to the AP, Barzani also said he “wholeheartedly” supports Sunni desires to create their own self-rule regions in Iraq.  Sunni lawmakers, whose Iraqiya political coalition won the most seats in 2010 parliamentary elections but were outmaneuvered by Maliki for the right to form the government, bitterly complain they have no say in Iraq’s power structure.  Unless something is done to alleviate the concerns of Kurds and Sunnis about their place in the national government, Iraq might inevitable collapse.

Salvation however might still lie within, courtesy of the federal elements of the Iraqi constitution.

(2010 Iraqi Parliamentary Election Results – From Wikipedia)

Iraq’s Ethnic Federalism

Under Iraq’s current ‘ethnic/religious federalism’, major political powers are divided among people representing the three main religious/ethnic division: the Kurds who make up 20% of the population, and between the two Muslim faiths (65% Shia and 30% Sunni).  Therefore, the convention that has emerged since 2005 (when the current constitution came to force) has been to elect a President of Kurdish background, while the Prime Minister has to come from the Shia community, and the Speaker of the Council of Representatives (parliament) from the Sunni community.

In Iraq’s federal structure there are four different levels of government: the central government in Baghdad, the regions (currently only one – Iraqi Kurdistan), the provinces (eighteen) and the local administrations.  The Iraqi constitution is very much typical federal constitution, in the way it distributes powers vertically.  The federal/national government in Baghdad has limited enumerated powers, and the provinces are endowed with their own distinct political/legislative/judicial authorities.  Therefore, the constitution provides that the regions enjoy a great amount of power under this structure, often at the expense of the central government in Baghdad.

The constitutions federalism even grants provinces the power to join together and form ‘regions’ which will be semi-autonomous.  Although Iraqi Kurdistan is the only legally defined region within Iraq, with its own government and quasi-official militia, other provinces can do the same through a referendum (See: Art. 115 of the Iraqi Constitution).

Therefore, Article 115 applies to provinces joining together and forming a region.  In fact, instead of blocking the creation of large and powerful administrative regions in the country that could confront central government or even each other, the constitution actually encourages it. This is particularly worrying considering that separatism is already a very powerful trend in Iraq.

In Iraq, it was very much expected that the governorates will begin the process of grouping together immediately after the parliamentary elections of 2005.  Political tensions between the three communities, could lead to further ethnic/religious divisions and the eventual ‘partition’ of Iraq.  According to Zaid Al-Ali, “the result will most likely be that Iraq will eventually come to resemble Belgium, whose federal structure of government contains three states: Flanders (Flemish-speaking), Wallonia (French-speaking), and Brussels itself.”  Similarly, Iraq is likely to be divided in three parts, with a Kurdish region in the north, a Shia-dominated south and a Sunni region in the center.

Horizontal Federalism – the Iraqi Federation Council

The only way to prevent this from happening is by strengthening ‘horizontal federalism’ within the Iraqi federal government.  Under the Iraqi Constitution, there are to be two legislative houses, the Council of Representatives and the Federation Council.  The Council of Representatives is directly elected by the people, “at a ratio of one representative per 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi people.”  The Council of Representatives has the power to enact all federal laws, including the approval and adjustment of the federal budget, conduct foreign policy and defense, and consent to a declaration of war or state of emergency.

On the other hand, the Federation Council does not exist yet.  The Federation Council is to be composed of representatives of regions and all governorates that have not joined a region.  The Constitution does not enumerate the formation or functions of the Federation Council, but leaves those particulars to the Council of Representatives.  (See: Article 62 of the Iraqi Constitution)

There are plenty of available models for a second legislative chamber representing sub-national entities (like the German Bundesrat, or the South African National Council of Provinces), but of course the U.S. Senate could be the best model to protect the provinces and curb the federal government’s powers.

A second legislative body, which represents all provinces equally, with a primary function of safeguarding the rights and privileges of the regions and provinces from excessive overreach by the federal government will go a long way in alleviating fears and concerns by the ethnic/religious minorities of Iraq – as well as strengthen federalism and prevent any further talk of secession of break-up.

Getting the Maliki government to implement such a reform is another thing…

Sources:

AP Interview: Iraqi Kurd leader hints at secession, by Lara Jakes

Power Struggles in Baghdad and Beyond Mean Opportunities for Iraq’s Kurds, By Tony Karon

Iraq: a constitution to nowhere, by Zaid Al-Ali

By the People and for the People – A New Approach to the Federal Budget!

One of the primary responsibilities of any government (both executive and legislature) in any country is the management of the public purse: the government budget and the national debt.  As developments in Europe demonstrate, bad management of government expenditures could lead to financial collapse and government default.  Although the U.S. is in a much better financial footing then most European countries of similar socio-economic and development level, dealing with the national debt has captured the attention of most politicians.

Proposals for the reduction of the government deficit and eventual elimination of the national debt have come from both sides of the political spectrum, including bipartisan efforts like the Simpson-Bowles Commission (see: National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform).  Democrats primarily want to raise taxes on the wealthier Americans (repeal Bush tax-cuts) and reduce the defense budget, in order to close the deficit gap.  Republicans on the other hand want to primarily reform entitlements (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) which combined account for close to 45% of the Federal budget and will only get larger due to demographic changes.

Most likely, the right solution lies somewhere in between, which is what was the recommendation of the Simpson-Bowles Commission: raise some taxes, reduce some defense spending, and reform entitlements for future generations.  Unfortunately there is no guarantee that even if our current political leaders were able to adopt such a grand compromise, future generations would not commit the same ‘management mistake’ of past decades: cut taxes which reduces government revenues, while expand government spending through borrowing.

Some on the right have argued passionately about the need for a ‘balanced budget amendment’ to the Constitution.  Constitutional amendments are hard to pass, and even harder to change in the future; although the sentiment might be just right considering the danger that out of control debt can pose to a national economy and future generations.  However, instead of looking for funding to cut and taxes to raise, there might be another way to restructure the federal budget in a way might have a more lasting impact.

A New Federalism for Libya and the Arab Spring.

Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Libya’s road to democracy was going to be the hardest of all the Arab nations in transition.  Last month, that process got even more complicated for the Libyan people.  At a gathering in Benghazi, around 3,000 political, militia and tribal leaders from eastern Libya (the region known as Barqa or Cyrenaica) announced unilateral plans to begin establishing their own autonomous government.  In particular, they demanded a return to the loose federation that existed before Qaddafi came to power in 1969, composed of three regions: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan.

The conferees said they want their region to remain part of a united Libya, but needed to do this to stop decades of discrimination against the east.  In particular, the conference declared that the eastern state, known as Barqa, would have its own parliament, police force, courts and capital – Benghazi, the country’s second largest city – to run its own affairs.  Foreign policy, the national army and oil resources would be left to the central government in the capital Tripoli in western Libya.

The move was vehemently denounced by the leaders of the National Transitional Council (NTC) in Tripoli, who rejected any calls for a federal Libya.  Mustafa Abdel Jalil, head of the National Transitional Council, even claimed that they were inspired by elements loyal to Gaddafi’s old regime.  Overall, the idea of federalism is very controversial in Libyans, as well as throughout the Arab world.  The concept is a sensitive one largely because it has become synonymous with fragmentation and partition.  Even though in the past countries like Egypt, Syria and Iraq attempted to unite through federal systems, for modern Arabs federalism caries many negative connotations, with Sudan’s recent break-up dominating most people’s concerns about federalism.

SCAF’s Constitutional Declaration – Uncertainty and Hope for Egypt’s Bicameral Legislature.

February 11 marked the one year anniversary of the official fall of Hosni Mubarak from power.  What started with street demonstrations and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) overthrowing the President and dissolving the Parliament, was followed by a referendum to amend the existing constitution and fresh Parliamentary election.  On February 22, the voting process which began in November of 2011 was completion with the second and final round of voting for the Shura Council.

These Parliamentary elections in the post-Mubarak Egypt, conducted under a new legal regime that allowed previously banned political parties, promised to usher in a new era of democracy and political pluralism for Egypt.  However, as we enter this period of transition, where a democratically elected legislature will operate under a military government while presidential elections are being organized, Egypt’s political establishment will have to balance the legislative needs of the country (which are many) with the preparation for a ‘mini constitutional convention.’  In this period of transition, Egypt’s legislative branch will stand in the middle of this immensely complicated balancing act; and its success of failure will define the countries fortune and the fate of the Arab Spring.

The Real Cause of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis.

The Greek sovereign debt crisis has capture the attention of the world, both for what it says about the viability of the Euro and the EU integration project, but also for the warning signs it sends to governments around the world about governance and public finances.  In the U.S., politicians both on the right and the left are using Greece as an example of how bad management of public finances can lead to economic catastrophe.

In particular, for the right, Greece is at the edge of the abyss because of the bloated government bureaucracy, the unreasonably generous pension and health-care benefits, and the sclerotic labor market.  For the left, Greece’s financial troubles could easily be resolved if people paid their taxes properly, and the umber-wealthy were prevented from tax-evading so blatantly.

However, the true cause of the Greek sovereign debt crisis is the same as the reason why Europe cannot manage the greatest threat to ever hit the Eurozone: the failure of the governance system.  The Greek system of governance has failed to address the type of economic issues present in almost every country of the world – issues well known to all, and easily fixable.  Poor management of public finances in Greece is not some generically inherent predisposition of the Greek people – rather it’s what happens when you have a bad system of governance.

America – A Constitutional Midwife for the Arab World!

A recent article by Nathan Brown in the FP (Americans, put away your quills), argues very eloquently against the advocacy and promotion of ‘American constitutional ideas’ (and ideals) in Arab countries currently in transition due to the Arab Spring.  Although the history of U.S. constitutional transplantation is mixed at best (failed in Latin America in the eighteen hundreds, was somewhat more successful in Germany-Japan-Italy after WWII, remains to be seen what happens in Iraq), I respectfully disagree with Mr. Brown’s assertion that “much of our advice will be bad and most will be irrelevant.”

The Middle East – North Africa (MENA) region represents that last remaining undemocratic region of the world.  No other region has the highest concentration of authoritarian regimes and absolute monarchies.  Although the U.S. has a lot of baggage on its side, especially when it comes to its foreign policy during the past 60 years, the one thing that America can still brag about is its system of governance.  The one thing that the U.S. can still educate the rest of the world is governance!  [Do as I say, not as I do!]

Mr. Brown is right in pointing out that the U.S. constitutional experience is very idiosyncratic.  On the other hand, I would venture to say that the U.S. system of governance is what has contributed immensely to the longevity of the republic and the overall success of the American economy.